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Abstract
This work describes the using of Universal and Strongly Universal classes of hash
functions for unconditionally secure message authentication in quantum cryptogra-
phy. Different classes are compared and constructions of ﬂexible "-Almost Strongly
Universal classes are described. A new upper bound on the lifetime of a single hash
function in one-time padded tags is introduced and optimisation on the ﬁnal QKD
key rate is shown for the QuAKE experiment, a B92 based QKD system. The public
channel communication protocol of QuAKE is described, with special stress on the
security issues.A Rifca, che attendevavi
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1
Quantum cryptography
Cryptography is the science that studies the methods of making messages meaningless
to unauthorised third parties. The usual manner to attain this purpose is to use algo-
rithms, called ciphers, that process the input message and whose output, called cypher-
text, is determined by some additional secret information, called the key. Obtaining the
original message without knowing the key must be computationally very hard; on the
contrary, extracting the message from the cyphertext and the key must be reasonably
fast.1 By means of cryptography, it is possible to transmit a message on a public channel
without anybody being able to understand its meaning, given that both the sender and
the receiver share a secret key that must be delivered on a different, secret, channel.
Symmetric key cryptography is based on cryptosystems where the same key is used
both by the sender to encrypt the message, and by the receiver to decrypt the cyphertext.
Examples of symmetric key cryptosystems are DES, AES and RC4.
Asymmetric key cryptography, also called public key cryptography, uses two dif-
ferent keys to perform the two phases of encryption and decryption, so one of the two
keys can be made public, while the other one is kept secret. This can be used in two
ways: if the public key is used to encrypt messages, the cyphertexts will be decodable
only by the owner of the private key. In the other way, the owner of the private key
can encrypt information that will be decodable by everybody: this allows what is called
“digital signature”, that is anyone can decrypt the cyphertexts and be reasonably sure
that the message may only have been sent by the owner of the private key. The most
widespread asymmetric key cryptosystem is RSA.
1In terms of complexity theory, the deciphering problem should lie within the nondeterministic poly-
nomial time (NP) class, and outside the bounded-error probabilistic polynomial time (BPP) class [KL07].2 Quantum cryptography
1.1 Key distribution
The length of the key being equal, symmetric key cryptosystems are generally faster
and safer, so usually asymmetric key cyphers are used only to secretly transmit tempo-
rary keys for faster symmetric cyphers. Without using key agreement protocols, ﬁrst
published by Difﬁe and Hellman in 1976 ([DH76]), or asymmetric key cyphers, the only
way to exchange secret keys would be by physically meeting the other party of the com-
munication, or by using a trusted courier.
Almost every cryptosystem2 grounds the secrecy of the cyphertext on the computa-
tional limitations of the possible adversaries. Most symmetric cryptosystems could be
forced if the adversary could produce all the possible messages by trying every possible
key on a given cyphertext, and then choose the message which sounds more sensible:
this operation is generally hard, because the number of all the possible keys is chosen to
be very high.
All asymmetric cryptosystems and Difﬁe-Hellman based key exchange protocols rely
on functions which are extremely easy to calculate, but computationally hard to invert
without a “trapdoor”. These functions are called one-way functions and exploit mathe-
matical problems like the factorisation of large numbers in two prime numbers or the
computation of the logarithm in ﬁnite ﬁelds, or operations on elliptic curves.
The main problem with these systems is that none of the mathematical problems they
are based on has ever been proven to be really intractable3, so it is possible that one day
an algorithm will be found which allows to “crack” all the cyphertexts produced until
then.
1.2 Quantum properties
A way to answer the need for a secure key distribution system comes from quantum
physics.
Quantum particles obey some laws which can be used as an advantage towards an
attacker. For example:
• it is not possible to perform measures on an unknown quantum state without per-
turbing it (uncertainty principle);
• it is not possible to duplicate an unknown quantum state (no cloning theorem);
• it is not possible to measure a photon on two nonorthogonal bases at the same time.
If we transmit information by means of single photons, it is possible to turn these
laws into a way to check if the transmission has been observed by an adversary. We can
2One-Time Pad is an example of symmetric key cryptosystem which is not based on computational
complexity to achieve the secrecy of the encrypted message. See paragraph 4.2.
3That is, not to belong to the NPP class.1.3 BB84 3
encode one bit of information in the quantum state of each transmitted photon: this unit
of information is called qubit, from “quantum bit”.4
1.3 BB84
The ﬁrst protocol for quantum key distribution is BB84, and was introduced by Bennett
and Brassard in [BB84]. It is based on the transmission of single photons where the
information is encoded into the state of polarisation. The party that sends the photons
is conventionally called “Alice”, while the receiver is called “Bob”.
Alice and Bob choose two polarisation bases that are not orthogonal to each other,
and in each basis they assign value “0” to one state and value “1” to the orthogonal state.
Let us assume that the two nonorthogonal bases are 0°/90° and 45°/-45° and the chosen
values are:
.
. 0
. 1
.
. 0
. 1
Alice chooses two random binary sequences of the same length: one for the bases
and one for the binary values to transmit. Then Alice sends the single photons polarised
according to the values of the two random sequences. At the receiving side, for every re-
ceived photon, Bob must randomly choose one of the two bases to perform his measure.
If the chosen basis is the same as the one chosen by Alice, the photon is correctly mea-
sured, while if the basis is the wrong one, the photon will give unpredictable random
results, evenly distributed between 0 and 1.
After the quantum transmission, Alice can reveal on the public channel the actual
sequence of bases used for the polarisations. Since she is only telling the bases, and not
the polarisation state,she is not disclosing any additional information on the transmitted
bits. That is, if the attacker (called “Eve”) did not perform any measure on the transmit-
ted photons, the sequence of chosen bases does not carry any information on the actual
values coded by each photon.
When Bob receives the bases used by Alice, he can reply on the public channel with
a list of positions where Bob performed a successful measure on the photon and the
two bases coincide. He can also append a random list of some of the outcomes of his
measures,so that Alice can check that the transmission has been successful. The revealed
values will then be discarded from the list of secret bits.
The only way for an attacker to extract some information from the whole process,
is to perform some measures on the polarised photons and then let these photons con-
tinue their way to the receiver, or send some other polarised photons in place of the
4Formally, a qubit is a two-dimensional vector space over the complex numbers.4 Quantum cryptography
intercepted ones. In any case, for every possible strategy chosen by the opponent, these
measures will introduce either errors, or losses, or both, on the quantum channel, and
by comparing some random values of the quantum transmission it is possible to detect
intrusions with high probability.
See table 1.1 for an example of realisation of the BB84 protocol.
Positions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Alice’s bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Values 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Quantum channel
Polarisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bob’s bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bob’s measures . . . . . . . . . . .
Bob’s values 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Public channel
Bases comparison ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sifted values 0 1 0 0 0 1
Compared values 1 0
Comparison result ✓ ✓
Final values 0 0 0 1
Table 1.1: BB84 example.
QKD cannot be efﬁciently used as a system to transmit a given data form the sender
to the receiver, because the received data is an unpredictable subset of the transmitted
bits without knowing the exact bases used by Alice. Yet, this uncertainty can be turned
into an advantage towards a possible attacker. Even if the ﬁnal data shared by Alice and
Bob cannot be predicted at the beginning of the whole process, the important fact is that
Alice and Bob share the very same data, which, therefore, can be used as a shared secret
key.
1.4 B92
The present work has been developed to provide authentication to the QuAKE project,
developed by QuantumFuture, a strategic project of Padova University. QuAKE has
been designed to implement B92, a simple protocol introduced by Bennett in [Ben92].
B92 works with only two nonorthogonal states and does not require Alice and Bob to1.5 Other protocols 5
reveal the sequence of chosen bases. A possible setup is the following. Alice encodes
her random bits into the following polarisation quits:
Alice’s encoding
. 0
. 1
Bob, then, detects the received photons with two single-photon avalanche diodes
(SPAD) screened by two polarising ﬁlters, each one oriented along one of the two or-
thogonal polarisations . and . . When one of the two SPADs clicks, it is impossible
that the detected photon had a polarisation orthogonal to that of the corresponding ﬁl-
ter, so the only possibility is that the photon had the only other possible polarisation. So
Bob’s decision rule is:
Bob’s decision rule
. 1
. 0
An example of B92 protocol is described in table 1.2.
Positions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Values 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Quantum channel
Polarisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bob’s measures . . . . . . . . . .
Bob’s values 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Public channel
Compared values 1 0
Comparison outcome ✓ ✓
Final values 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Table 1.2: B92 example.
1.5 Other protocols
The set of QKD protocols is not limited to polarisation-based protocols. Other QKD
systems use entangled photons and phase interference. An extensive survey on QKD
can be found in [GRTZ02].6 Quantum cryptography
1.6 QKD distillation phases
Since the quantum channel is not perfect, some quits may be wrongly detected even if
the chosen basis is the right one. Alice and Bob, therefore, must correct the transmission
errors through a classical transmission on the public channel, and at the same time they
have to keep the information that Eve can gather on the ﬁnal data (both from observa-
tions on the quantum channel and from the messages that have been transmitted on the
public channel) as low as possible.
In other words, there are three main aims when generating secret keys:
• correctness, i.e. Alice’s key must be equal to Bob’s key;
• secrecy, i.e. Eve’s information on the key must be zero;
• uniformity, i.e. the entropy of the ﬁnal key must be maximum.
Let  a be the ﬁnal key obtained by Alice, let  b be Bob’s ﬁnal key and let   be the
length of  a. Let   be a random variable that describes all the observations performed
by Eve on the quantum channel, and   all the messages exchanged by Alice and Bob on
the public channel. In practice it is required that there exist three values  ′  ′′  ′′′, small
enough, such that:
   a ̸   b     
′ (correctness)
   a  b         
′′ (secrecy)
       a     
′′′ (uniformity)
The main way to achieve these purposes is to divide the key processing performed
by Alice and Bob in distinct phases: quantum transmission, sifting, key reconciliation,
and privacy ampliﬁcation. Each of these phases aims at a different target.
Quantum transmission
During the quantum transmission Alice shares some randomness with Bob. The main
aim is to maximise the mutual information between the key sent by Alice (the raw key)
and the key received by Bob.
Sifting
The aim of sifting is to distill the advantage of Alice and Bob with respect to Eve, that is
to have a mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s data which is greater than the
mutual information between Alice’s key and the attacker’s observations.
After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob must agree on the positions of the
correctly transmitted photons. In the case of BB84, Alice (or Bob) transmits the sequence
of chosen bases to the other party, which replies with a list of the positions where the1.7 The need for authentication 7
bases chosen by Alice agree with the bases chosen by Bob. In B92 it is sufﬁcient that Bob
sends a list of the positions of all the received photons. Then a randomly chosen sample
of bits is chosen by one of the two parties and is revealed, so that it is possible to estimate
the amount of losses and errors.
The output of this phase is called sifted key.
Key reconciliation
This phase aims at reducing the probabilities that Alice’s and Bob’s ﬁnal keys are differ-
ent.
After the sifting phase, Alice and Bob must correct all the errors occurred during the
quantum transmission, using reconciliation protocols like Cascade (see [BS93]), Winnow
([BLT+03]) or protocols based on LDPC ([ELAB09], [MDMD10]).
The key resulting from this phase is called reconciled key.
Privacy ampliﬁcation
The aim of privacy ampliﬁcation is to reduce the information that Eve still has on the
reconciled key below a given threshold. This can be achieved by estimating an upper
bound to the knowledge that Eve may have collected during all the previous phases
and by compressing the reconciled key with an appropriate function, like multiplying
the key by a random Toeplitz matrix (see paragraph 3.1).
1.7 The need for authentication
In principle, an opponent could pose as one of the legitimate parties and perform both
the quantum and the classic transmission pretending to be the intended counterpart,
without raising any suspect. The only way to prevent this kind of attack is by authenti-
cating the messages exchanged on the public classical channel through an authentication
code. Since every authentication code requires some preshared keys, Alice and Bob can-
not initiate a QKD session without some common secret information. Therefore, QKD
should actually be called quantum key growing, since it produces arbitrarily long secret
keys starting from a small amount of secure key material.Chapter
2
Unconditionally secure authentication
2.1 Authentication codes
When we deal with QKD, if one of the messages transmitted through the public channel
is altered, the whole system could be prone to man-in-the-middle attacks, or, more gen-
erally, to denial-of-service attacks that would aim at disrupting one or all of the stages
of key sifting, reconciliation, and privacy ampliﬁcation.
Authentication is the mean by which we address the issue of being sure that the
transmitted information has not been forged or modiﬁed by a third party. With the right
authentication system we can assure ourselves both that a message has been sent by the
person that claims to be the sender (i.e. the message authenticity), and that the message
has not been modiﬁed on the way to the receiver (i.e. the integrity of the message).
An authentication framework We want to be able to send one or more messages be-
longing to the message set   from a legitimate sender to a legitimate receiver, and we
want the additional property that an opponent, which is not a legitimate party of the
transmission, had a very low probability of forging a fake message or substituting a le-
gitimate message with a fake message without being detected. The situation where the
opponent simply inserts a fake message into the channel is called an impersonation attack,
while when the opponent intercepts a correct message and sends a forged message in
place of the legitimate one is called a substitution attack.
For a chosen authentication system, we call  I the maximum success probability over
all impersonation attacks, and we deﬁne  S as the maximum probability of success over
all substitution attacks.
One may wonder if there exist an optimum authentication scheme for a given key
length. Lower bounds were derived in [Mau00] for the success probability of imperson-
ation and substitution attacks on a system with multiple messages authentication over
a public error-free channel. By denoting with   the secret key shared by Alice and Bob,10 Unconditionally secure authentication
with  1      i the messages to be authenticated, and with  1      i the authenticated
messages transmitted over the channel, the following bound for the impersonation at-
tack at the  -th message authentication holds [Mau00, Theorem 3]
 I     
 
 I(k;xj x1;:::;xj 1)               (2.1)
whereas for the substitution attack [Mau00, Theorem 6]
 S     
 
 H(k x1;:::;xj 1;xj)  
 
 H(k x1;:::;xj)               (2.2)
The above bounds suggest partitioning the key   into       independent and uniform
subkeys  0      i, so that
 j      j  0  j                (2.3)
and    j  0    is a one-to-one function of  j for any value of  j  0. A possible way to
implement (2.3) is to use a simple OTP scheme, where some subvector  j of  j is given
by
 j      j  0     j               (2.4)
Then, from (2.3) we have
     j  1      j 1       j  j       j       j  j   
     j       2  j                (2.5)
and
     1      i       0    2  0  (2.6)
where  j is the number of possible values for  j.
Observe that in this case, the lower bound in eq. (2.1) becomes
 I     
 
 j
              (2.7)
and is attained by the OTP scheme (2.4), which is therefore optimal in this respect.
On the other hand, the bound in eq. (2.2), which becomes
 S     
 
 0
              (2.8)
is derived under the assumption of a generic attack aimed at recovering the key, and is
believed to be rather loose, when    0       j .
Nevertheless, we consider systematic authentication schemes of the type (2.3)-(2.4)
where  j     j  j ,   is a keyed hash function with  j as input,  0 as key, and tag  j of
the same length as  j.2.1 Authentication codes 11
Therefore, the sender and the receiver share a secretly chosen encoding, and use it to
generate and check the tags. The opponent does not know which is the selected encod-
ing,but does know the complete description of all the possible encodings,their statistical
distribution and the statistical distribution of the messages.
Therefore, if we deﬁne a couple       to be valid if   is the correct tag for the message
  with the currently selected encoding, we can deﬁne:
 I   max
^ m  
^ t  
            is valid 
 S   max
^ m̸=m  
^ t;t  
            is valid       has been observed 
We can view all the possible encodings as a multiset of keyed hash functions, that is, a
pool   of hash functions, each of which is uniquely identiﬁed by an index. The sender
and the receiver can agree on the selected hash function by sharing a secret key   chosen
from the set   of all the possible indexes.
If the chosen hash function family exhibits some “good properties”, the values  I
and  S will be extremely low, and therefore it will be difﬁcult1 for an attacker to forge
the correct tag for a chosen message.
It’s important to stress the fact that in the current authentication model we are not
making any assumption on the computational capabilities of the opponents, such as
computer speed and storage memory, or time available for the attack. This is in contrast
with all the those security methods based on the difﬁculty of solving given problems,
for instance the factorisation of large prime numbers.
Our measure of security, that is, the limits on  I and  S that will be shown in this
work, relies only on combinatorial features which are intrinsic traits of the classes of
hash function that we will study, and for this reason this authentication is called uncon-
ditionally secure.
The other important aspect to stress is that our hash functions are not related to the
well known cryptographic hash function, which are generally deterministic functions (not
indexed), and which have features we are not interested in: we are not concerned by
preimage resistance or collision resistance of the single hash functions of our classes.
On the contrary, most of our hash functions exhibit a very simple structure.
General properties of authentication codes Let       be a valid couple formed by a
message and its tag. When an attacker intercepts      , it’s easy to get the set of all the
possible hash functions of the class   that could have generated   from  :
       ≜                   
1In all this work, the word difﬁcult, when referred to an attack, means that the probability of success
is extremely low, and is not related either to the difﬁculty of calculations or to the space and time taken by
the computation.12 Unconditionally secure authentication
Since all the hash functions are injective, it’s easy to prove that, for a given message  
taken from the message set  , the sets        form a partition of  .
Now we can write explicitly the probability of impersonation, under the hypothesis
that the hash functions are uniformly distributed:
 I   max
m  
t  
        is valid    max
m  
t  
        
   
(2.9)
There exist one or more couples       that maximise the right term which are the weak-
est couples of the code, that is, the couples that have exactly probability  I of being
valid.
The probability of substitution becomes:
 S   max
^ m̸=m  
^ t;t  
            is valid       has been observed   
  max
^ m̸=m  
^ t;t  
                      
         
 
  max
^ m̸=m  
^ t;t  
                                   
                    
(2.10)
In this case there is no determined couple that attains the maximum  S, but one (or
more) pair of couples                   that gives  S. In general, for each legitimate couple
      observed by the opponent, there are one or more couples that maximise the prob-
ability of being valid, but in any case this probability will be bounded by  S.
2.2 Universal hashing
The concept of Universal hash functions was introduced in 1977 by Carter and Wegman
in [CW77].
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let   be a class of hash functions from a set of messages   to a set of
tags   .
Let         and          .
A family of hash functions is  -Almost Universal (or  -AU2) if
             1       2            1  2       1 ̸   2
If     1
N,   is simply called Universal (or U2).
If we deﬁne a collision as the case where a certain hash function gives the same tag
for two different messages, a U2 class of hash function guarantees that the number of2.3 Strongly universal hashing 13
collisions generated by a single function is bounded from above.2 Moreover, if we as-
sume to take the keys   uniformly over  ,   is the collision probability between the hash
values of two different messages.
It’s important to notice that a U2 class alone is not sufﬁcient to give a valid authenti-
cation code.
Consider the following example:
Example2.1. Let             a,                 and let  be the class of functions:
 k                                        mod                 
It’s easy to see that such a class is U2, in fact two messages collide under the same
hash function only if they are equal.
The number of collisions for each couple of different messages is 0, but forging a
tag for a fake message is very easy. If the original message   is not periodic, it sufﬁces
intercepting the couple       to recover the secret key  . Now we can forge a valid
couple           that will be accepted as a valid message by the receiver. This attack is
possible because  -AU2 hash functions do not require any feature that allow to limit the
probability of substitution  S or the probability of impersonation  I.
2.3 Strongly universal hashing
In [WC81], Wegman and Carter introduce a new kind of hash function class: 3
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let   be a class of hash functions from a set of messages   to a set of
tags   . Let          .
Let         and          .
A family of hash functions is  -Almost Strongly Universal (or  -ASU2) if
1.                        F
N                 
2.              1     1    2     2       F
N    1 ̸   2        1  2    
If         the class is simply called SU2.
These properties are crucial for our goal: let’s suppose an opponent has observed a
valid       couple. Now the attacker is able to identify the subset  ′ of hash functions
that could have generated our  . Property 1 gives us the exact cardinality of this subset,
so that (if       ) it will be impossible to identify the right function with certainty. But
2The upper bound given by the deﬁnition is not the lowest possible: in [Sar80] an optimally universal
(OU) class of hash functions is deﬁned as a "-AU2-class with a collision number bounded by M N
mn N.
3In [WC81] Wegman and Carter deﬁne only SU2 classes, but they describe the concept of "-ASU2
(calling it “almost strongly universal2”) without formalising it.14 Unconditionally secure authentication
there could exist a “lucky” message     ̸     that is mapped to a single value     by each
hash function      ′. If this was the case, we would not need to ﬁnd out the exact hash
function, but we could be able to forge a valid couple           that would not be detected
as a fake one.
Property 2 is what addresses the issue noted above. It states that, for every subset  ′
identiﬁed by a legitimate couple      , the number of hash functions in  ′ which map
a given message     ̸    into the same tag     is upper bounded to be a fraction   of   ′ . If
  is much smaller than 1, the success probability  S of a substitution attack is very low,
namely:
 S    
where the maximum is attained by choosing a couple           that maximises          
                       .
In other words, the two properties of  -ASU2 hash function classes allow to give an
upper bound on the two probabilities  I and  S (see eqs. (2.9) and (2.10)).
The concept of SU2 can be generalised to prevent substitution attacks based on the
observation of up to       valid couples      .
Deﬁnition 2.3. [WC81] Let   be a class of hash functions from a set of messages   to a
set of tags   . Let          .
Let         and          .
A family of hash functions is Strongly Universall (or SUl) if, for every choice of  
different values  1      l     and   (not necessarily different) values  1      l     ,
there are exactly    l functions which map  i into  i for each            .
Orthogonal arrays and SU2 class
One method to get a strict SU2 class is to build an orthogonal array.
Deﬁnition 2.4. [Bie96] An orthogonal array with parameters OA        is a multiset
  of mappings from a  -set   into a  -set   such that for every choice of   distinct
elements  1  2      l     and   (not necessarily distinct) elements  1  2      l    
there are exactly   elements       affording the operation    i     i            .
  can be visualised as a matrix where every row   corresponds to the message  i,
and every column   to a different mapping  j. The elements of the matrix are the values
 j  i .
It is easy to see that an OA        can be used as an authentication code for the set
of messages   and the set of tags   . More exactly, this is a SUl class of hash functions.
If we put      , our OA        is described by a matrix with   rows and   2
columns [Sti88]. A lower bound for the value   can be found in [PB45] and is given by
   
            
 2 (2.11)2.4 ∆-universal hashing 15
Moreover, in [Sti94a] Stinson shows that a SU2 class   of hash functions from   to  
reaches its minimum size4                 if and only if there exists a OA       
with    
M(N 1)+1
N2 .
With the help of this parallel,we can see that,keeping the same  to leave unchanged
the probabilities of success of the opponent’s attacks, the number of messages that can
be authenticated by a SU2 hash function class grows only linearly with the size of the
class of hash functions. In fact we can derive by equation (2.11)that  2           .
Recalling that in our optimal SU2 construction         2, we obtain the bound
        
2
Wegman and Carter in [WC81] note that if we don’t require the probability of success
 S to be the theoretical minimum 1
N, but we let it reach 1
N   , the size of the message set
  grows exponentially.
2.4 ∆-universal hashing
∆-universal families of hash functions ( -∆U) are a generalisation of Xor-universal fam-
ilies (which will be described subsequently) and their deﬁnition is due to Stinson in
[Sti96].
Deﬁnition 2.5. Let   be a class of hash functions from a set of messages   to a set of
tags   which is an additive abelian group. Let          .
Let        .
A family of hash functions is  -∆ Universal (or  -∆U) if
             1       2                1 ̸   2             
Xor-universal hashing
This kind of hash functions have been ﬁrst described by Krawczyk in [Kra94] who called
them  -otp-secure hash functions. Rogaway renamed them  -Xor-universal in [Rog95].
A family of hash functions is deﬁned Xor-universal if it is ∆-universal and      Z2 l
for some  .
In this case, the addition operation of the abelian group is the bitwise exclusive-or.
4see theorem 2.13 with " = 1/N16 Unconditionally secure authentication
2.5 Authentication and channel coding
The similarities between Authentication codes and forward error correcting codes have
been noticed independently by Bierbrauer in [Bie97a] and by Johansson, Kabatianskii
and Smeets in [JKS93]. The goal of a well designed authentication code is to have the
minimum number of collisions among tags of different messages, generated by all the
possible hash functions. The key observation is that such a requirement is the same as
getting a high minimum distance between the words of a forward error correction code.
Let’s formalise this observation. Suppose that we have a family of keyed hash func-
tions (e.g. an  -AU2). We can index every hash function with the index          , and
every possible message with the index          . The codomain of our hash function
is      n. We can think of the different tags as the symbols of our code, so we have an
alphabet with cardinality  n. If, for each message  , we concatenate all the hash values
generated by all the hash functions applied to  , ordered by index, we obtain the word
that will code for the message  . Namely, if we call   the coding function:
         1     2         F 1     F    
Every codeword is formed by  n     bits, but we will not be required to ever generate
the whole bit string.
Now we can choose two different messages  1 and  2 and see how many collisions
there are between their hash values: it is sufﬁcient to compare every symbol with the
same index in their codewords. If they have the same symbol (that is, the same hash
value) in the same position, we found a collision. So the number of symbols that do not
get to a collision is the distance between the two codewords.
The minimum distance of a code is deﬁned as
    min
m1̸=m2
 H    1     2  
where  H is the Hamming distance.5 Usually the relative distance is deﬁned as    ,
where   is the number of symbols in one codeword, so in our case it is in fact    .
Therefore, calling   the ratio between the number of collisions and the total number
of functions, we can state that:
       
 
 
so an  -AU2 hash function family with cardinality   identiﬁes a code with minimum
distance         .
On the contrary, if we have a FEC code C with minimum distance   and block length
 , we can use it, for the set of messages accepted by C, just as if it were an -AU2 class. To
generate the hash value for the message  , we choose a secret index   and take the  -th
symbol as the hash value for  . For what we have just seen, this way of generating hash
5Note that the code symbols are not the single bits, but the hash values.2.6 Relationships 17
values forms exactly an  -AU2 hash function family, because it complies with deﬁnition
2.1.
We don’t have, in principle, an actual construction for the generic hash function in-
dexed by  : we could be required to calculate the whole codeword      before being
able to select the only symbol  . To get a viable way of quickly hashing messages, we
must ﬁnd a code that allows us to limit the computational load by selectively generating
single symbols of the codeword.
2.6 Relationships
It is possible to identify some useful relations among these hash function families.
Theorem 2.1. [Sti96] If   is  -ASU2,
1. it is  -AU2.
2. Moreover, if   is an abelian group,   is  -∆U.
Proof. 1. To show the ﬁrst result we use property 1 of deﬁnition 2.2. Choosing a ﬁxed
value  , if we put  1    2 we get that
             1       2           
 
 
Since we have   different choices of the value  , we ﬁnd that
             1       2     
 
∑
t  
             1       2           
 
 
       
 
 
    
2. For a given  1 ̸   2     and       we have:
             1       2         
 
∑
 t  
             1                 2                 
 
 
    
So   is  -∆U.
Theorem 2.2. [Sti96] If   is  -∆U, it is  -AU2.
Proof. If we let       in the deﬁnition of  -∆U families, we get:
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Theorem 2.3. [Sti96] If there exists a  -∆U hash function family   of cardinality   that maps
  into   , with       and       then there exists a  -ASU2 hash function family   of
cardinality        that maps   into   .
Proof. Let  (f;) be the function deﬁned by:
 (f;)              
Let       (f;)               . We must now prove the two properties of deﬁnition
2.2. Let         and        . We have that          .
1. We use the fact that   is an abelian group.
   (f;)        (f;)                                      
 
∑
  
                      
∑
 t  
                        
 
 
2. We must prove that    (f;)        (f;)  1     1    (f;)  2     2       F
N
   (f;)        (f;)  1     1    (f;)  2     2    
               1         1      2         2    
               1       2     1    2      1     1        
 
∑
  
             1       2     1    2      1     1        
 
∑
 t  
             1       2     1    2      1           
               1       2     1    2           
 
 
2.7 Compositions
To build a good authentication function, it is not necessary to study an  -ASU2 from
scratch. We can instead compose different families of one or more classes of hash func-
tions to obtain a new family with characteristics which are different from the formers.
In this way we can focus our efforts on improving different characteristics of the compo-
nents of a hash function family, and the best hash functions are in fact designed taking
advantage of the following results.
Theorem 2.4. [Sti94b] Let   be an  -AU2 class of   hash functions from   to   . Then there
exist an  -AU2 class  i of   i hash functions from  i to   i.2.7 Compositions 19
Proof. For each      , we deﬁne:
 
i    
i    
i
  1      i         1         i  
Let  i     i         .
Theorem 2.5. [Sti94b] Let  1 be an  1-AU2 class of  1 hash functions from  1 to  1, and let
 2 be an  2-AU2 class of  2 hash functions from  2    1 to  2. Then there exist an  -AU2
class   of   hash functions from  1 to  2 with
     1    2    1 2
and
     1 2
Proof. For each couple   i  j     1    2, we deﬁne:
 i;j    1    2
      j  i    
Let       i;j     i  j     1    2 .
Theorem 2.6. [Sti94b] Let  1 be an  1-AU2 class of  1 hash functions from   to  1, and let
 2 be an  2-ASU2 class of  2 hash functions from  1 to  2. Then there exist an  -ASU2 class  
of   hash functions from  1 to  2 with
     1    2
and
     1 2
Proof. For each couple   i  j     1    2, we deﬁne:
 i;j    1    2
      j  i    
Let       i;j     i  j     1    2 . Let’s prove the two properties of deﬁnition 2.2:
1. For a given couple      :
                           1  2     1    2    2  1             
 
∑
 t
    1  2     1    2    1             2             
 
∑
 t
   1    1    1             
 2
 
 
 1 2
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2. We have to prove that              1     1    2     2       F
N    1 ̸   2  
     1  2     . First let’s suppose that  1    2    :
             1       2         
      1  2     1    2    2  1  1      2  1  2          
 
∑
^ t  1
    1  2     1    2    1  1     1  2           2            
 
∑
 t1̸= t2
(
   1    1    1  1       1  1  2       2        2    2    2    1     2    2       
)
 
 
∑
^ t  1
(
   1    1    1  1     1  2               2    2    2           
)
 
   1      2    2    2    1     2    2     
   1 1  
 2
 
   1    2
 2
 
    1    2 
 1 2
 
   
 
 
The second case is when  1 ̸   2:
             1     1    2     2    
      1  2     1    2    2  1  1      1  2  1  2      2    
 
∑
 t1̸= t2
(
   1    1    1  1       1  1  2       2   
     2    2    2    1     1  2    2     2  
)
 
 
∑
 t1̸= t2
(
   1    1    1  1       1  1  2       2  
)
   2
 2
 
 
   1    2
 2
 
    1    2 
 1 2
 
   
 
 
2.8 Bounds
To analyse the features of our hash functions, we must introduce some bounds on the
cardinality of speciﬁc families.
Bounds for AU2 classes
Theorem 2.7. [Sar80] Let   be an  -AU2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
and         . Then
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Theorem 2.8. [Sti94b] Let   be an  -AU2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . Then
   
        
             2       
Theorem 2.9. [NR10] Let   be an  -AU2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . Then
   
 
 
⌈
log2  
log2  
   
⌉
Bounds for ∆U2 classes
Theorem 2.10. [Sti96] Let   be an  -∆U class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
and         . Then
   
 
 
Theorem 2.11. [Sti96] Let   be an  -∆U class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . Then
   
        
                 
Theorem 2.12. [NR10] Let   be an  -∆U2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . If
log2     log2    
(√
  
(
   
 
 
)
 
 
 
)
then
   
 
 
⌊
log2  
log2  
⌋
Bounds for ASU2 classes
Theorem 2.13. [Sti94b] Let  be an  -ASU2 class of hash functions from  to   . Let       ,
       , and         . Then
       
        2
                 
Theorem 2.14. [GN93] Let   be an  -ASU2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . Then
     
 
 2 log 
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" <
(
   
log2 N
log2 M   log2 N
)
 
N
" >
(
   
log2 N
log2 M   log2 N
)
 
N
"-AU
        
             2       
 
 
⌈
log2  
log2  
   
⌉
"-∆U
        
                 
 
 
⌊
log2  
log2  
⌋
if log2 M < log2 N  
(√
2H
(
1   1
N
)
  1
2
)
"-ASU
   
        2
                 
 
 
⌊
log2  
log2  
⌋
if log2 M < log2 N  
(√
2 F
N
(
1   1
N
)
  1
2
)
 
 
 2 log2  
Table2.1: (Adapted from [NR10]) Lower bounds for the cardinality  of different classes
of hash functions.        ,        .
Theorem 2.15. [KSJ96] Let   be an  -ASU2 class of hash functions from   to   . Let        ,
       , and         . If
log2     log2    
(√
 
 
 
(
   
 
 
)
 
 
 
)
then
   
 
 
⌊
log2  
log2  
⌋
(2.13)
Nguyen and Roscoe point out in [NR10] that the bounds described in theorems 2.9,
2.12, 2.15, and 2.14 are better than the ones contained in 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.13 when the
  is higher than      
(
   
log2 N
log2 M log2 N
)
1
N. The previous results are summarised in table
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"-AU log2
(
 
 
⌈ 
 
   
⌉)
"-∆U
log2
(
 
 
⌊ 
 
⌋)
if m < n  
(√
2r+1 (
1   1
2n
)
  1
2
)
"-ASU
    log2
(
 
 1
⌊ 
 
⌋)
if m < n  
(√
2 F
N
(
1   1
N
)
  1
2
)
log2      log2  
 1   log2 log2  
 1
Table 2.2: (Adapted from [NR10]) Lower bounds for the logarithm  h of the cardinality
of different classes of hash functions  .  h   log2    ,     log2    ,     log2    .
We can observe that, even if the bounds on the left side of table 2.1 can be more
accurate for some values of  , they become quite useless when we deal with very large
message sets  : in those cases it is impossible to exactly calculate the lower bound for
  (e.g.   could be 106
as well). Since in our environment we will authenticate messages
as long as a million bits, we will always use the bounds on the right column (see table
2.2 for logarithmic bounds).
2.9 Attacks
While this authentication system looks like perfect, it doesn’t deal with the case when
the opponent has partial information on the one-time pad keys,as in the case of quantum
key distribution. In fact, in QKD, after using all the keys that must be shared before the
starting of the system, Alice and Bob will use keys that have been generated by the key
generation process. As was seen in chapter 1, the opponent could have some residual
information about the exchanged key, and our authentication system can not ignore this
fact.24 Unconditionally secure authentication
Partial knowledge on the key
The main threat to an -ASU2 authentication has been proposed by Larsson and Cederlöf
in [CL08].
They study the case where the opponent has partial knowledge on the key. This event
is anything but unlikely, because during the quantum transmission a little amount of
information could have been intercepted by Eve without being noticed,and also because
all the data exchanged over the public channel is, by deﬁnition, public. The privacy
ampliﬁcation step in QKD is designed to make the information that Eve has on the ﬁnal
key as little as possible, but some small amount of information will still be retained by
the opponent.
Cederlöf and Larsson highlight how Eve is, in principle, able to inﬂuence the mes-
sages that are exchanged on the public channel by altering the quantum transmission.
Since she is not trying to extract information by the photons, but only to increase the im-
pact of the information she already has, she is not required to make any kind of measures,
and therefore altering the quantum states and ﬁnally being detected.6
When Eve intercepts a valid couple      , where   is the message which could have
been inﬂuenced by her, she can partition the family   in the classes
                           
Let’s call this partition
 m
The blocks of  m correspond to the sets        determined by all the values of       ,
that is
 m  
∑
t  
      
Since Eve has some information on the actual hash function, she can use all her infor-
mation with the purpose of excluding possible hash functions. Inﬂuencing the message
 , she has some control on the partition. If she is able to exclude some hash functions by
a single class       , and if the number of hash functions in it falls under     , it may
be that all the remained functions map another message     into another tag    . In this
case, Eve would be sure that the substitute couple           would be valid, and therefore
her substitution attack would be successful.
It is important to point out that, with this attack, the opponent knows exactly when
the attack will be successful, and can choose to perform it only in this case.
The best situation the opponent could aim to, is the condition where every block of
functions has either size      or    . In fact, when the selected hash function falls
into a block of size     , it could happen that there exist a message     that is mapped
into a single tag    .
6For instance, she could in some way just affect the position of the slots in which Bob receives some
photons.Chapter
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Constructions of  -ASU  classes
In this chapter we will show some fundamental and ﬂexible constructions of  -ASU2
classes of hash functions. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of the existing
 -ASU2 classes.
3.1 Toeplitz matrices
Toeplitz matrices have constant diagonals. A binary Toeplitz matrix   has elements
 i;j         such that
 i;j    k;l                            
Such matrices can be completely characterised by expressing only the ﬁrst row and ﬁrst
column, as the remaining elements are equal to the ﬁrst item of the diagonal they belong
to. Since the element in position       is shared by the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column, we
can describe a Toeplitz matrix using only an array of           bits, which is called the
seed of the matrix.
Let’s deﬁne a hash function which uses Toeplitz matrices. Let          m and
         n. For each pair     where is a Toeplitz matrix with rows and columns
and       is an array, we can deﬁne a hash function:
 (A;b)        
           
Let   be the set of all these functions.
Theorem 3.1. [MNT90]   is 1
n-ASU2 (that is, SU2).26 Constructions of  -ASU2 classes
Proof. Let’s prove property 2 of the deﬁnition 2.2. For each choice of  1 ̸   2     and
 1  2     :
            1        1   2        2    
               1    2     1    2   1        1  
For each matrix  , there is only one array      1     1 such as   1        1, so we can
count only the number of matrices   which satisﬁes the equality    1    2     1    2:
            1        1   2        2    
           1    2     1    2                       
where we let      1    2 and      1    2. Note that   ̸   , because  1 ̸   2 and we
are using the binary sum. If we write the matrix element  i;j by its seed value, that is as
 n i+j, 1 we can write the expression        as the following system of linear equations:
 
     
     
∑m
i=1  i i    n ∑m
i=1  i+1 i    n 1
    ∑m
i=1  i+n 1 i    1
Since   ̸   , the   equations are linearly independent2, and so the dimension of the
solution space is exactly      . Each set            1        1   2        2  has
therefore size  m 1. The number of all the possible hash functions in   is
       
n+m 1    
n    
2n+m 1
1That is, we write the matrix
 
 
   
 
 
 
a1;1 a1;2 ::: a1;m 1 a1;m
a2;1 a2;2 ::: a2;m 1 a2;m
: : :
: : :
: : :
: : :
an 1;1 an 1;2 ::: an 1;m 1 an 1;m
an;1 an;2 ::: an;m 1 an;m
 
 
   
 
 
 
as:  
 
   
 
 
 
n n+1 ::: n+m 2 n+m 1
n 1 n ::: n+m 3 n+m 2
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
2 3 ::: m m+1
1 2 ::: m 1 m
 
 
   
 
 
 
2The same system of linear equations obtained by the multiplication of a Toeplitz matrix A by an array
x:  
 
 
   
 
 
an an+1 ::: an+m 2 an+m 1
an 1 an ::: an+m 3 an+m 2
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
a2 a3 ::: am am+1
a1 a2 ::: am 1 am
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
x1
x2
: : :
xm 1
xm
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and so
            1        1   2        2      
m 1  
   
 2n
We have thus proved property 2. Property 1 can be easily proved using the last part of
the proof of property 2.
Features
Class size The class size is exactly
       
2n+m+1
Indexing We can index every hash function of this class by concatenating the seed3
         n+m 1 of the Toeplitz matrix and the array       . Every hash function is
indexed by the            binary array      .
Implementation The implementation is straightforward: one could develop the actual
Toeplitz matrix from the seed and then perform a matrix-array multiplication, otherwise
one could implement the same multiplication in an efﬁcient way taking advantage of the
special structure of the Toeplitz matrices. Tang, Duraiswami, and Gumerov [TDG04],
and Bodrato ([Bod07]) give an example of an efﬁcient algorithm to perform this task.
In this way it is not necessary to explicitly express (and therefore store in memory) the
whole matrix, which in many cases may have as many as hundreds of rows and millions
of columns.
To authenticate messages which are shorter than   bits, it is enough to truncate the
number of columns of the Toeplitz matrix to the actual length of the message, if we are
using the classical authentication, or to shorten the seed accordingly, if we are using an
efﬁcient algorithm which only uses the seed.
The binary addition between arrays adds a negligible complexity to the previous
step.
can be described by:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 ::: 0 x1 x2 ::: ::: xm 1 xm
0 0 ::: x1 x2 x3 ::: ::: xm 0
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
:::
0 x1 ::: ::: ::: xm 1 xm ::: 0 0
x1 x2 ::: ::: ::: xm 0 ::: 0 0
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
a1
a2
: : :
an+m 2
an+m 1
 
 
 
 
   
 
Now it becomes evident that, when at least one of the coefﬁcient of x is not null, the equations are inde-
pendent.
3That is, every element ai;j of the Toeplitz matrix is equal to the seed element sn i+j.28 Constructions of  -ASU2 classes
Remarks This class of hash functions is not suitable to be used only once, in the context
of QKD, because it needs an amount of random data (the key length) that is greater than
the message to be authenticated.
3.2 Binary matrices
A class of SU2 hash functions for messages of length   and hash length   is obtained
by taking a random binary matrix   of size       and an array   of length  . The hash
value for a message   is calculated as       . This class has the same properties as the
Toeplitz based class, but its size is much larger and its hash computation is slower, so it
is rarely used in practice.
Features
Class size The class size is exactly
       
(m+1)n
Indexing We can index each hash function by concatenating of the matrix   (either in
row-major or in column-major) and of the array  . Every hash function is indexed by a
binary array of size         .
3.3 Stinson
In [Sti94b], Stinson reﬁnes a construction due to Wegman and Carter in [WC81].
The ﬁnal  -ASU2 class is built on a U2 class  1 and a SU2 class  2.
Let   be a prime power, and let  1   Fp   Fp and  1   Fp. So   1     1    2 and
  1     1    . For each     Fp the function  x is deﬁned as:
 x    1   Fp   Fp    1
               
Let  1 be the set of all the functions  x:
 1     x       Fp 
It is straightforward to prove that  1 is a U2 class of hash functions.
Applying theorem 2.4, for each             it is possible to build a    -AU2 class  2j
1
of   hash functions from  2j
1 to   2j 1
1 . Then it is possible to use theorem 2.5 to combine
all the classes  2j
1 in a single    -AU2 class  2i
1 of  i hash functions from  2i
1 to  1, with
  2i
1      2i
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To deﬁne  2, let   be a prime power and let   and   be two integers so that      . Let
 2   Fqs and  2   Fqt.   2     2    s and   2     2    t. For each     Fq. Let ϕ
be any surjective linear transformation from  2 to  2. For each          2    2 let the
function  xy be deﬁned as:
 xy    2    2
     ϕ        
Let  2 be the set of all the functions  xy:
 2     xy           Fqs   Fqt 
It is possible to prove that  2 is a SU2 class of hash functions (see [Sti94b]).
If the elements in Fqs and Fqt are represented by vectors on Fq, it is possible to deﬁne
ϕ    as any ﬁxed subset of the coefﬁcients of size  , that is:
ϕ      ϕ   1      s       i1      it 
Now we can build the ﬁnal  -ASU2 class   of hash functions.
Choosing the class  2i
1 with      s, we obtain an    s-AU2 class of hash functions
from  2i
1 to  1, with   2i
1      2is and   1     s. Then it is possible to compose the    s-
AU2 class 2i
1 with the SU2 class 2 using theorem2.6. The result is the    s    t -ASU2
class  .
Now we can choose the right parameters: let      ,      ,      2i
1 , and      2,
with        m and         n. Let
        ⌈log2 log2  ⌉ (3.1)
   
⌈
log2
 
 
⌉
(3.2)
It is possible to check that
 
 s  
 
 n
so   is a    n 1-ASU2 class of   hash functions, with
     
(i+1)s+n
Features
Class size The class size is exactly
       
(i+1)s+n
with         ⌈log2 log2  ⌉ and    
⌈
log2
m
s
⌉
.30 Constructions of  -ASU2 classes
Indexing We can index every hash function of this class by concatenating   binary ar-
rays of size  , which are the keys for the   steps of universal functions, plus one more
binary array of size   and another one of size  , which are the keys of the strongly uni-
versal function. So every hash function is indexed by a binary array of size             .
Implementation The message is processed in       rounds. At the beginning of the
ﬁrst   rounds, the input is padded with zeros up to a length multiple of   . Let  j be the
key for the round  : in the ﬁrst   rounds the message is repeatedly split in blocks of size
   and the hash function  kj is applied to each block. The concatenation of the results is
the input for the next round. The ﬁnal round consists in the application of the strongly
universal hash function  kakb, where  a and  b are the two keys for the  2 function. The
linear transformation can be implemented by simply taking the ﬁrst (or the last)   bits.
Optimisations A possible improvement could be that of applying the universal
hash functions only for the number of steps that are strictly necessary to reduce the size
of the message to  . Then it is possible to skip to the application of the ﬁnal strongly
universal hash function.
Remarks The key size is much shorter than  , that is the size of the messages in  .
3.4 Krawczyk
Krawczyk constructions are three different constructions of  -ASU2 classes introduced
in [Kra94] and [Kra95]. These are all based on  -AXU classes (see theorem 2.3), formed
by Toeplitz matrices which seed has been obtained from so-called  -biased distributions
(described by Naor and Naor in [NN90]). The main problem in two out of three of the
constructions is that the key is formed by the description of an irreducible polynomial,
which is not efﬁciently encoded, so the length of the key is larger than log2    . More-
over, in the third construction (the scalar product construction) it is possible to notice that
different keys produce the same hash function, and this problem worsens as the class
size increases, so the entropy of the key is not completely used. In any case, the Reed-
Solomon class addresses these problems with a smaller size.
3.5 Reed-Solomon
Using the similarities between  -ASU2 classes shown in paragraph 2.5, we can use Reed-
Solomon codes as a component of an  -ASU2 hash function class. This construction is
due to Bierbrauer, Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets (see [BJKS93]).
Using coding theory notation,a       q-code is a code with minimum distance that
processes messages of length   on a  -sized alphabet and returns codewords of length3.5 Reed-Solomon 31
  on the same alphabet. In general, a      -code is a code which processes messages of
length   and returns codewords of length  . The Reed-Solomon code is optimal, in the
sense that it is an      -code that reaches the minimum distance              .
In Reed-Solomon encoding (see [RS60]), the message is seen as a concatenation of  
coefﬁcients of a polynomial on a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq. The codeword is obtained by oversam-
pling the polynomial in       different points of Fq and concatenating the results. If up
to       symbols get lost, the original message is still recoverable.
We choose the Reed-Solomon        q-code with the following parameters:
     
r+s
         
s
                 
r+s    
s
     
r+s
Going back to authentication codes notation, this Reed-Solomon code is capable of
encoding binary messages of length up to      (n+s)(1+2s) (from now on,   is the length
of the ﬁnal tag) and produces a  1-AU2 class of hash functions with
 1      
 
 
     
 n+s
 n+s  
 s
 n+s  
 
 n
Now it is possible to compose the  1-AU2 class with the  2-ASU2 class  2 (see para-
graph 3.3) of the hash functions from F2s to F2n. Therefore, by theorem 2.6, the ﬁnal class
  of hash functions is  -ASU2, with
     1    2  
 
 n  
 
 n  
 
 n 1
Features
Class size The class size is exactly
       
3n+2s
Let   be the maximum message length:   must be chosen to be the smallest integer
such that
                 
s  (3.3)
Usually   ≫  , so it is possible to approximate     ⌈log2     log2  ⌉.4
Indexing We can index every hash function of this class by the concatenation of a bi-
nary array of size    , which is the key for the universal function, with a binary array of
size   and another one of size , which are the keys of the strongly universal function.
So every hash function is indexed by a binary array of size        .
4If the requirement of equation (3.3) does not hold, it is sufﬁcient to choose s as the smaller integer
that makes (3.3) feasible.32 Constructions of  -ASU2 classes
Implementation Let  1        n+s be the key for the universal hash function and  a  
     n+s and b        n The message is padded up to a length multiple of   and then
is split in   blocks of length    . Every block   is multiplied by  
j 1
1 for each            ,
then all the results are summed. The multiplications and exponentiations are calculated
in F2r+s.
The second phase consists in the application of the strongly universal hash function
 kakb, as in Stinson’s construction.
Remarks The key size is the shortest in all the constructions considered in this work.
3.6 Comparison between class sizes and lower bounds
We can compare the different sizes of these constructions with the lower bounds (2.12)
and (2.13). It is possible to see that Reed-Solomon construction has good performances
versus both   and  .3.6 Comparison between class sizes and lower bounds 33
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Figure 3.1: Key length as a function of message length  , compared with lower bounds
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Figure 3.2: Key length as a function of tag length  , compared with lower bounds (2.12)
and (2.13).Chapter
4
Reusing the same key
In the previous chapters it has been seen that changing the selected hash function is very
expensive, because many secret bits have to be used to form a key which will deﬁne the
new hash function.
In the context of QKD, the rate at which we use secret bits is fundamental to de-
termine the soundness of the whole key generating system. In fact, the random data
used by Alice and Bob as the index for the new hash function are extracted by the same
stream of secret bits generated by the quantum system. Therefore, the overall net key
rate produced by the QKD is given by the rate of secret data stream at the end of privacy
ampliﬁcation to which the rate of key consumed by the authentication process has to be
subtracted.
If we are able to reduce the rate of the key used by the authentication, all the saved
bits will increase the net key rate, so it is crucial to use as little key as possible for the
authentication purpose.
In QKD, it is necessary to authenticate one or more messages during a single round,
so it is necessary to ﬁnd a way to use the same hash function as long as possible, without
letting the security of the whole process to diminish under a ﬁxed threshold.
4.1 One-time pad
One-time pad (or OTP), that is a Vernam cypher with a keystream which is random, uni-
formly distributed and is used only once,is an encryption method that attains Shannon’s
perfect secrecy (see [Sha49]). This means that, if   is the message and   is the cyphertext
that codes for  ,
              (4.1)
that is to say that the observation of   gives absolutely no information about the original
message.36 Reusing the same key
One-time pad encryption is very easy to perform: if the message   is formed by
the concatenation of many symbols   1      n , with  i    , and       is an algebraic
group, a one-time pad key   must be composed by as many random symbols (of the
same alphabet  ) as the message  :
      1      n 
The cyphertext   is given by:
      1      n 
 i    i    i
4.2 Strongly Universal Hashing and One-Time Pad
To answer the need for multiple authentication, Wegman and Carter in [WC81] mention
the possible use of SUl hash function families to reuse a single hash function up to      
times: nevertheless, the number of functions in such a class increases exponentially with
  (see Atici and Stinson in [AS96]). Another method suggested by Wegman and Carter
is to encrypt the tag obtained by a ( -A)SU2 hash function with one-time pad. Since the
one-time pad changes at every authentication round, it is impossible for the attacker to
ever identify the selected hash function, basically because he has no information about
the hash value generated by the hash function, as shown in equation (4.1).
In [WC81] Wegman and Carter also show that the choice of encoding the tag with
a one-time pad key leads to an authentication code that is asymptotically optimal. Their
proof is reported here for completeness.
Theorem 4.1. [WC81] Let   be a  -ASU2 class of hash functions from   to the group   .
Let’s choose a hash function   with uniform distribution in  . If we authenticate a sequence of
messages  i by ﬁrst calculating their hash value with   and then encoding the hash values with a
one-time pad key  i chosen with a uniform distribution in   , so  i      i   i, then an attacker
who only sees the couples   i  i  has a probability  D of successfully forging a valid tag     for a
message     of his choice that is upper bounded by
 D    
Proof. Let     be a generic message chosen by the opponent. Let                      
                                 . Since   is  -ASU2, for each value of   there are at
most      functions that map   into       and     into        , so
    1  1    1      
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Moreover,for each couple    1       1  1    1 ,there is exactly one sequence  1      n 
that satisﬁes the set of equalities
 
 
 
   1     1    1
   
   n     n    n
so the opponent will not be able to gain any additional information on the set of possible
hash functions  . The chances of successfully substituting a valid couple  i  i with a
valid forged couple          , therefore, are upper bounded by
 S   max
mi̸= ^ m  
ti;^ t  
                     i         i                   
        
   
       
       
   
Now let’s consider the case where, for   times, an opponent can choose a message
 i, tries to produce a valid tag    i, and then is given the right tag  i.
Theorem 4.2. [WC81] If the opponent’s probability of forging the right tag at round   (   i    i)
is
 D    i             
then the size of the set of hash functions must be
     
 
 1          n
Proof. Let  0     and  i             l     l              . The strategy of the
opponent could be that of choosing,at round ,a random element of the set i to calculate
   i. If  D    i, then        i 1      i    i       i  i 1 , so
  i     i  i 1              
Considering the last round, we obtain
  n     1          n  0 
and, therefore,
     
 
 1          n
because  0     and   n     .
Corollary 4.1. If we require  1          n    , then we need       1
pn and at least   log2  
to identify a hash function in  .
If we used a SU2 hash function with OTP encoding for the tag, it would take us
     log2   bits for n rounds, where   is the key size for the SU2 function, we can state
that the key consumption would be asintotically optimal.38 Reusing the same key
Remarks The secrecy of the OTP key alone is completely unsecure, because, knowing
just the selected hash function, the opponent is able to calculate the hash value of an
intercepted message and then to recover the OTP key, so the substitution attack is trivial.
So it is not enough to have a perfect secrecy on the OTP encoding.
OTP advantages
In [AS96], Atici and Stinson show that it is possible to save some key by not encoding
the ﬁrst tag with OTP, relying only on the properties of  -ASU2 classes. In this way,
they expose the authentication code, at least for the ﬁrst couple      , to the Cederlöf-
Larsson attack (see paragraph 2.9). Encrypting all the hash values, as in Wegman and
Carter original idea, on the other hand, protects the authentication code by this threat,
while, at the same time, the optimal asymptotical behaviour is not affected.
4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised
With the OTPencryption of the tag, the Cederlöf-Larsson attack (paragraph) is no longer
possible: since the tag   is encrypted, most of the times the opponent is not able to de-
termine which block        of the partition  m is identiﬁed by the intercepted couple
     .
While OTP encryption on the tag allows a single hash function to be used more than
once, though, it also has a new weak point. Since the hash function is used many times,
the opponent can store all the information extracted in a series of observed valid authen-
tication. As a consequence, the more a single hash function is used, the higher are the
opponent’s chances of a successful attack.
Abidin and Larsson study the same problem in [AL11]. They give simpliﬁed models
to calculate the probability of success of the opponent’s attacks and describe the results
of simulations of attacks. We will give, instead, an upper bound to the probabilities of
success of the attacks.
Hypothesis
In the QKD, the privacy ampliﬁcation phase is designed to leave the opponent with not
more than a given amount of information. Let   be a random variable which describes
all the observations made by the opponent on both the quantum and the public channel
during the quantum key generation phase. Let  h the random variable which represents
the key of the  -ASU2 hash function, and  OTP the random variable which represents a
generic key of the OTP encryption.
We may postulate that Eve has at the most  h bits of information on the selected hash
function and  OTP bits of information on each OTP key used to encrypt the tag, that in4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 39
symbol meaning
 OTP maximum leaked information on each OTP key
 h maximum leaked information on the selected hash function
ℓ information leaked per binary symbol
  tag length
  hash function key length
Table 4.1: List of parameters for the analysis of a new attack to authentication codes
based on  -ASU2 hash function classes with OTP-encrypted tags.
terms of mutual information means:
   h       h
   OTP       OTP
Since the key length required to select a hash function is larger than the length of the
OTP key, tipically  h    OTP. We can hypothesise that in the long run the hash function
keys will be taken by the same repository where the OTP keys come from, so that the
opponent has the same average information on them. Namely, if   is the length of  h
and   the tag length, we can assume that:
 h   ℓ     (4.2)
 OTP   ℓ     (4.3)
We can assume, like in Larsson-Cederlöf [CL08], that Eve can inﬂuence the messages
  exchanged between Alice and Bob on the public channel, but now it is impossible
for the attacker to try to break the authentication code in the same way described by
Cederlöf and Larsson, simply because the hash value   is encrypted into the tag  . As a
consequence, Eve cannot identify the corresponding block       .
All the attacker could do is trying either an impersonation attack, a collision attack,
or wait until it is possible to recover the exact OTP key used and then trying the original
Cederlöf and Larsson attack.
Let   j  j  be a generic intercepted message with its tag. Since the hash value  j of
the message  j is encrypted with a one-time pad key, we can state that
   h  j  j       h     OTP (4.4)
and therefore:
   h  1  1      j  j         h          OTP    h  (4.5)
In other words, if the maximum information possessed by Eve on a single OTP key is
 OTP, this is the exact amount of information that she has on the unencrypted hash value40 Reusing the same key
of the message  , and therefore she can not obtain, with each observation, more than
 OTP bits of information on the original tag.
It is possible to relate all the possible attacks against an authentication code made of
an OTP encrypted  -ASU2 hash function class   to the task of identiﬁcating a certain
subset        . That is to say that, for each type of attack and for each selected function
 k, the probabilities of success are maximised if the opponent is able to identify a certain
set     which the selected hash function  h belongs to.
Hypothesis for attack description
For a simple description and a rapid estimate of the probability of success of each possi-
ble attack, we can suppose that the opponent uses all the information obtained only to
rule out as many hash functions as possible from the set of all the possible candidates,
so that, if  e is the set of possible hash functions, each      e has en even probability
    e  of being the selected function.
When Alice and Bob start using a new hash function, and no couples       have yet
been transmitted, all the information that Eve has on the hash function is limited to  h
bits, and therefore the entropy of the hash function key  h, that is equal to the entropy
of the hash function, is
   h         h
The entropy of a uniformly distributed random variable       is        log2    , so
the size of the set  e is upper bounded by  ⌈k ih⌉.
After having intercepted   authenticated messages, the entropy of  h is at most    
      OTP    h  and the size of the set  e is upper bounded by
  e     
⌈k ih j iOTP⌉ (4.6)
Hypothesis for upper bounds
In order to give an upper bound to the probabilities of success of each attack, we have
to study Eve’s best way of exploiting her gathered information on  k.
Let     be a subset of   that give the maximum probability of success to the opponent.
Let the size of     be upper bounded by some value  :
          
We want to know how much information is needed by Eve to have a certain proba-
bility of success    .
Let  h be the random variable that describes the current selected hash function and
let      be its probabilty mass distribution:
             
   i     i      h    i    i    4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 41
Without loss of generality, let the hash functions  1      F be ordered in descending
order by their probability  i, so that
 1    2          F
It is straightforward to see that:
   h         
∑
h    
   h         1                   1          X (4.7)
Let     be the sum of the   highest probabilities  i:
    ≜  1          X
The minimum information needed by Eve to have probability   h              is lower
bounded by the difference between the initial entropy    h  and the maximum entropy
   max of a probability distribution that satisﬁes        1          X. The distribution that
maximises the ﬁnal entropy is obtained when exactly   hash functions have probability
      and the remaining ones have probability                  .
This can be proved as follows. Let  X be a subset of   of size  , and let’s deﬁne two
conditioned p.m.d.:
 
′            
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where  2       is the binary entropy of the random variable    .
Since     is given, the maximum of      is reached only if  ′ and  ′′ are uniformly
distributions, namely:
max       max
p′;p′′
(       
′                
′′     2      
)
 
      log2              log2           2       (4.9)
The corresponding p.m.d. is:
             
{
   i   
 P
X   i    X
   i    1   P
F X   i ̸   X
Impersonation attack
The probability of success  I of an impersonation attack is limited by the knowledge on
the selected hash function that the opponent has gathered during the previous rounds
of authentication and, much more severely, by the knowlege on the OTP key.
Even if Eve knows the selected hash function, she has only  OTP bits of information
on the OTP key.
In this context, Eve has to guess the right OTP key among all the possible ones. This
means that the “good” subset   is made of only one element. Let    OTP be the only
element in  . The p.m.d. that maximises    OTP , given that the probability of   is    ,
is: {
   OTP    i     S        i      OTP
   OTP    i     F   1   P
N 1   i ̸     OTP
and consequently the entropy of the random variable  OTP is:
   OTP     S log 1
2  S  
∑
h̸=^ h
 F log 1
2  F  
      log 1
2
               log 1
2
       
     
The information available on  OTP is upper bounded by  OTP, so the maximum    
obtainable is given by the following equation:
 OTP   ∆   OTP            log 1
2
               log 1
2
       
     
(4.10)
Threrefore, the probability of success of the impersonation attack is upper bounded
by
 I       (4.11)
aside from any gathered information on the selected  -ASU2 hash function.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 43
Collision attack
Eve could try to ﬁnd a collision between the intercepted message   and any another
message    . In this case it is not necessary to ﬁnd the exact OTP key, because, since the
hash value of the fake message     is unvaried, so is the tag.
The selected hash function can be viewed as a random variable on the alphabet  .
When the hash functions are uniformly distributed, the entropy of the random variable
is log2      .
Since an  -ASU2 hash function class is also  -AU2 (see theorem 2.1), the following
bound is valid:
                              
If Eve succeeds in eliminating all the hash functions but   , she could be able to
substitute a valid message   with another message     being conﬁdent that the couple
        is valid.
It is possible to consider the correct hash function as a realisation of a random vari-
able on the alphabet of the    remaining hash functions. The maximum entropy of this
random variable is log2   , and in typical constructions of  -ASU2 functions   is equal
to   (n 1).
So, when the opponent collects       bits, the size of the  e could reach  k n+1 and
the attack could be successful.
Probability of success in case of larger sets  e
Even if the opponent is not able to shrink the set of candidate hash functions  e to a size
of   , it is possible to try an attack by substituting the message   with the fake message
    which maximises the probability of success of collision.
When   is intercepted, for each     ̸        the opponent can build the set
          ≜       e                 
The maximum probability of success of the attack, if all the functions in   are equiprob-
able, is given by:
 S   max
^ m  
           
  e 
The strategy that gets to the highest probability of success, therefore, is choosing a
set           and trying to rule out all the hash functions which do not belong to it. This
gives:
 S  
  
  e 
If  e is the information collected by Eve, the size of  e is:
  e      
⌊k ie⌋  
⌈k ie⌉ 44 Reusing the same key
so, if       (n 1), we can write
 S  
  
 ⌊k ie⌋    
ie n+1
Upper bound on the probability of success
With a different strategy, the opponent could be interested in maximizing the probabil-
ities of success of a substitution attack, without the need of being sure that the attack
will succed, that is, the opponent could not be interested in ruling out completely some
hash functions, but he could just aim at increasing as much as possible the difference of
probability between “good” and “bad” hash functions.
Consider the case of a collision attack: Eve’s target is to divide a given set    1  2 ,
that will be the “good” set, from the remaining set    1  2 C. The maximum size for
   1  2  is   .
Using the terminology of paragraph 4.3,    1  2  corresponds to the set  .
When Eve has no information about  , the entropy of the random variable  h is  .
After gathering some information, the hash functions in     and those in    C will have
different probabilities. Let          h        be the probability that  h is in the set    . The
p.m.d that gives the maximum entropy for a given     is:
{
   h         S  
 P
"F         
   h         F   1   P
F "F         C
and consequently the entropy of the random variable  h is:
   h   
∑
h    
 S log 1
2  S  
∑
h    C
 F log 1
2  F  
      log 1
2
   
  
           log 1
2
       
      
 
          log 1
2
   
 
           log 1
2
       
     
The loss of entropy after   authentications, therefore, is:
∆       h       h  1  1      i  i max         log 1
2
   
 
           log 1
2
       
     
(4.12)
and the corresponding probability of success of a collision attack is upper bounded by
 coll       (4.13)
This probability of success of a collision attack is valid only when the    hash func-
tions contained in     correspond to some set          . Nevertheless, it is a valid upper
bound to the probability against all collision-based attacks.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 45
Substitution attack
Another attack that an opponent could try to accomplish is trying to recover the OTP
key used in an intercepted couple      , then trace the unencrypted hash value   and
then perform the original Cederlöf-Larssen attack.
OTP key recovery
To recover the OTP key of an intercepted couple      , the opponent must know the
exact hash value   of the intercepted message  , since  OTP        .
The hash function class is  -ASU2, so by deﬁnition 2.2:
                                 
 
 
             
To reduce the size of  e to F
N, which corresponds to a maximum entropy of     bits,
Eve has to gain at least   bits of information on the hash function. When this happens, it
may be that all the candidate functions belong to a single block        for some       .
Then   is determined, and, as a consequence, so is the OTP key  OTP.
Probability of success in case of larger sets  e We can repeat the procedure of the
collision attack. To study the probability of decryption of the OTP key, we note that it is
upper bounded by the sum of the probabilities of the F
N most probable hash functions. In
fact, if this set     is equal to one of the sets        for some   and some  , the opponent
would have exactly this probability of recovering the OTP key.
If the opponent uses the strategy of using all the information to rule out as many
hash functions as possible and to have a uniform distribution of probability on all the
candidates in  e, the probability of success of the attack is given by:
 S   max
m  
v  
        
  e 
 
      
  e 
 
 
      e 
If  e is the information collected by Eve, the size of  e is:
  e      
⌊k ie⌋  
⌈k ie⌉ 
so we can write
 S  
 
     ⌊k ie⌋    
ie n
Upper bound on the probability of successful recovery of  OTP
As for the collision attack, we can study the case where the opponent just aims at in-
creasing as much as possible the difference of probability between “good” and “bad”
hash functions. In this case the set   of paragraph 4.3 is a given       .46 Reusing the same key
Given a certain amount of extracted information, Eve wants to maximise the prob-
abilities of the F
N most probable functions. If this set     is one of the sets        for
some       and       , than Eve is able to accomplish the substitution attack with a
probability of success that is the sum of all the hash functions contained in    .
Again, we study how much information Eve has to gather in order to have a certain
increase in her probability of success.
The probability that  h is in the set     is given by          h         
∑
h        h  
  . The p.m.d that gives the maximum entropy and, at the same time, the maximum
probability    , is: {
   h         S  
 P
F/N         
   h         F   1   P
F  F
N
        C
and consequently the entropy of the random variable   is:
   h   
∑
h    
 S log 1
2  S  
∑
h    C
 F log 1
2  F  
      log 1
2
   
F
N
           log 1
2
       
    F
N
 
          log 1
2                  log 1
2
       
    1
N
The loss of entropy after   authentications, therefore, is:
∆       h       h  1  1      i  i max         log 1
2                  log 1
2
       
    1
N
(4.14)
and the corresponding probability of succeeding in recovering the OTP key is upper
bounded by
 OTP       (4.15)
This upper bound gives a limit to the probability of ﬁnding out a single key of the
OTP encryption, and therefore the value of a single hash value  . This information alone
does not lead to an effective attack, except for the substitution attack described in the
following paragraph.
Upper bound on the probability of success of Cederlöf-Larsson attack
When the opponent has identiﬁed the right OTP key  OTP, it is possible to identify the
right couple      , and therefore deploy the original Cederlöf-Larsson attack. While
their original paper just describe the attack, we use the same procedure of the previous
paragraphs to give an upper bound on the probability of success of the substitution
attack of an  -ASU2.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 47
With the hash value  , Eve is able to identify the right partition        that contains
the selected hash function, and can ﬁnd the set of candidate functions calculating the
intersection between the previous set of candidate functions and       . Let  e be this
intersection, that is the updated set of all the possible hash functions. If  e corresponds
to some           (as deﬁned in paragraph 2.9), Eve would be able to deploy a successful
substitution attack.
Since               F
N for deﬁnition 2.2, Eve’s best strategy is to maximise the proba-
bilities of the   F
N most probable functions in  e.
Let     be the set of the   F
N most probable functions. The probability that the selected
hash function  h is in the set     is given by          h         
∑
h        h     . Let    C
be deﬁned as  e      . The p.m.d that gives the maximum entropy and, at the same time,
the maximum probability     is:
{
   h         S  
 P
"F/N         
   h         F   1   P
F
N  " F
N
        C
and consequently the entropy of the random variable   is:
      
∑
h    
 S log 1
2  S  
∑
h    C
 F log 1
2  F  
      log 1
2
   
  F
N
           log 1
2
       
F
N     F
N
 
              log 1
2
   
 
           log 1
2
       
     
Since the initial entropy of the hash function,given the observed couple     is   ,
the loss of entropy is:
∆                            log 1
2
   
 
           log 1
2
       
     
(4.16)
and the corresponding probability of succeeding in substituting       with a different
pair           is upper bounded by
 ced       (4.17)
The ﬁnal probability of success of a combined attack aimed at ﬁnding the right OTP
and then perform a Cederlöf -Larsson attack is therefore upper bounded by:
 comb    OTP    ced      OTP      ced (4.18)
where    OTP is     as deﬁned in paragraph 4.3 and    ced is     as deﬁned in the current para-
graph.48 Reusing the same key
Upper bound on the probability of success of a substitution attack
The actual probability of success of a substitution attack can be upper bounded by con-
sidering the “good” subset     as a set with   F
N elements, which could be all the functions
which belong to a same set          .
In this case,            F
N and   e          F
N.
The probability that the selected hash function  h is in the set     is given by      
   h         
∑
h        h     . Let    C be deﬁned as  e      . The p.m.d that gives the
maximum entropy and, at the same time, the maximum probability    , is:
{
   h         S  
 P
"F/N         
   h         F   1   P
F " F
N
        C
and consequently the entropy of the random variable   is:
      
∑
h    
 S log 1
2  S  
∑
h    C
 F log 1
2  F  
      log 1
2
   
  F
N
           log 1
2
       
      F
N
 
          log 1
2
   
"
N
           log 1
2
       
    "
N
Since the initial entropy of the hash function is  , the loss of entropy after   authenti-
cations is:
∆       h       h  1  1      i  i max         log 1
2
   
"
N
           log 1
2
       
    "
N
(4.19)
and the corresponding probability of succeeding in substituting       with a different
pair           is upper bounded by
 sub       (4.20)
Hash function lifetime
Let  D be Eve’s global probability of a successful deception attack.  D is upper bounded
by the sum of the probabilities of success of all the possible attacks, that we can sum-
marise in impersonation, collision, and substitution attacks:
 D    I    coll    sub
To get an upper bound to the number of times a single hash function can be used for,
we ﬁx a maximum deception probability   max
D that Eve can reach, after which we change
hash function.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 49
We choose to evenly distribute the maximum probability of deception among the
three attacks. Let  max     max
D   . Then:
 I    max (4.21)
 coll    max (4.22)
 sub    max (4.23)
To satisfy equation (4.21), we must have   n    max, so a necessary condition to have
feasible solutions is:
 
max
D        
 n (4.24)
The upper bound on  I derived by equation (4.10) on  I does not depend on the
number of observation, so it does not weaken when a new valid authentication is seen.
With the equations (4.12) and (4.19) we can calculate the minimum information that
the opponent must have in order to be able to accomplish an attack with given maximum
probability of success.
Now it is possible to calculate the lifetime of each  -ASU2 hash function under each
attack: it is sufﬁcient to calculate ﬁrst the minimum information ∆  needed by the
opponent to accomplish an attack with success probability  max, and then the number
of authentication rounds needed to obtain the given amount of information:
   
∆     h
 OTP
 
∆    ℓ    
ℓ    
 
∆ 
ℓ    
 
 
 
(4.25)
Lifetime for collision attack
∆ coll     max log 1
2
 max
 
        max log 1
2
     max
     
(4.26)
 coll  
∆ coll
ℓ    
 
 
 
(4.27)
Lifetime for substitution attack
∆ sub     max log 1
2
 max
"
N
        max log 1
2
     max
    "
N
(4.28)
 sub  
∆ sub
ℓ    
 
 
 
(4.29)
The global lifetime matches the highest between (4.27) and (4.29):
    max  coll  sub  (4.30)50 Reusing the same key
Parameters optimisation
Starting from a required   max
D , a set   of messages to be authenticated, and a given class
of hash functions, it is possible to optimise the sizes of both the hash function class and
the tag length  , in order to minimise the rate of the secret key needed for the authenti-
cation.
The key rate   is given by
   
 
 
    (4.31)
We note that   can be expressed as a function of   and the size   of the message set,
while   is a function of   max
D ,  ,   and ℓ.   and ℓ are parameters given by the speciﬁc
QKD system, and   max
D is the required maximum probability of deception, so we can
plot the rate   in function of  , ℓ,   and   max
D .
The minimum authentication key rate   is obtained with the lowest possible value
of ℓ, which is achieved only with a considerable loss of the privacy ampliﬁcation output
rate  pa. The net key rate  f obtained by the QKD is given by
 f    pa     (4.32)
and therefore the maximum  f is attained by maximising the difference between  pa
and  , both calculated with the same parameter ℓ.
We can express the length of the ﬁnal key after the privacy ampliﬁcation as a function
of the target average information leaked to Eve during the QKD process. Using the
results of [BBCM95] it is possible to derive the following result (see [CBC+11]).
Let  rec be the length of the reconciled key,  sec the length of secure key obtained af-
ter one round of privacy ampliﬁcation,  rev the number of bits revealed during the key
reconciliation phase, and   Eve’s Rényi information on the reconciled key. Let  miss rep-
resent the probability that Eve is observing on average more photons than the number
predicted by the estimation made during the previous phases of QKD.
With probability   miss, for every possible value of the following bound is veriﬁed
[CBC+11]:
 leak    tar  sec       secP         
 
 Nrec Nrev Nsec b ln 
(4.33)
If we bind  leak to be smaller than a ﬁxed value  , the maximum  sec is obtained by
the following result [CBC+11]:
 sec   max
{
    min
b
 tar         
}
Lifetime and rates for different classes of hash functions
The following ﬁgures show the performances of different classes of hash functions de-
signed to authenticate messages long up to   6 bits. The graphs plot lifetime   and rate
  against the tag length   for a given  max of   30.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 51
It is possible to note that Reed-Solomon based class performs quite as well as the
other classes in terms of rate, and is able to authenticate with the required security target
even with high values of ℓ (ﬁgures 4.7 and 4.8).
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Figure 4.1: Lifetime for SU2 hash function class obtained by random binary matrices.52 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.2: Rate for SU2 hash function class obtained by random binary matrices.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 53
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Figure 4.3: Lifetime for SU2 hash function class obtained by Toeplitz binary matrices.54 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.4: Rate for SU2 hash function class obtained by Toeplitz binary matrices.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 55
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Figure 4.5: Lifetime for  -ASU2 Stinson hash function class.56 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.6: Rate for  -ASU2 Stinson hash function class.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 57
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Figure 4.7: Lifetime for  -ASU2 hash function class obtained by Reed-Solomon codes.58 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.8: Rate for  -ASU2 hash function class obtained by Reed-Solomon codes.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 59
Behaviour with different Pmax
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the lifetime and the key rate of Reed-Solomon based classes
for different values  max.
It is possible to note that all the lifetime lines of ﬁgure 4.9 tend to different asymptot-
ical values.
In ﬁgure 4.10 it can be seen that, for long tags, the rate grows linearly with the tag
length, while the lowest rate depends on the speciﬁc value of max: in some cases ( max  
  10  20) it coincides with the smallest possible tag length, while sometimes the shortest
tag length has a short timelife that does not allow the cost of renewing h to be cushioned
(this is the case of the peak for  max     30).60 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.9: Lifetime for  -ASU2 hash function class obtained by Reed-Solomon codes for
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Figure 4.10: Rate for  -ASU2 hash function class obtained by Reed-Solomon codes for
different values of  max.62 Reusing the same key
Comparison between different classes of hash functions
The rate   is strongly dependant on the size of the hash function class. Large classes,
as classes based on Toeplitz matrices (see ﬁgure 4.11a), have long keys and, therefore, a
higher initial entropy    h .
Small classes like Stinson construction (see ﬁgure 4.11b) and those based on Reed-
Solomon codes (4.11c) have shorter keys and smaller initial entropy.
One could expect that classes with higher initial entropy would last longer, but, if the
hash function key  h has been generated by the QKD, the attacker knows a ﬁxed rate (ℓ)
of information on it, and this is enough to wipe out all the advantages given by a long
key.
In fact, the rate required by large classes is higher than that of small ones, because
the renewal of the selected hash function is much more expensive, and more frequent.
See ﬁgures 4.12 and 4.13 for a comparison between the performances of Toeplitz,
Stinson and Reed-Solomon based classes with the same parameters. Stinson and Reed-
Solomon based classes always perform better than Toeplitz ones (and reach higher val-
ues of ℓ, see paragraph 4.3). In ﬁgure 4.13, which shows a closeup of 4.12, it is possible
to appreciate the performance difference between Stinson and Reed-Solomon codes.
Figures4.14and4.15show that,for smaller values of ,the difference of performances
between Toeplitz and Reed-Solomon classes gradually decrease. The performances of
Stinson construction have not been plotted since would superimpose on Reed-Solomon
ones.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 63
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(a) Key length for SU2 class based on Toeplitz matrices.
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(b) Key length for "-ASU2 Stinson class.
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(c) Key length for "-ASU2 class based on Reed-Solomon codes.
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Figure 4.11: Key length for different classes of hash functions.64 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.12: Lifetime and rate for different classes of hash functions.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 65
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Figure4.13: Comparison of lifetime and rate between Stinson and Reed-Solomon classes
of hash functions.66 Reusing the same key
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Figure 4.14: Lifetime and rate for different classes of hash functions.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 67
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Figure 4.15: Lifetime and rate for different classes of hash functions.68 Reusing the same key
Net key rate for QuAKE
To evaluate the effects of authentication in a real application, we consider the case of
the QuAKE experiment (see [CBC+11]). During a single round of key processing (that
is the sum of sifting, reconciliation, and privacy ampliﬁcation) two authentications are
required (one by Alice and one by Bob) and an amount of 20000 bits ( rec) is processed
on average.1 The data transmitted on the public channel is between 500 kb and 1 Mb in
each way, so we consider the maximum message length to be authenticated as   6 bits.
The chosen reconciliation protocol is Winnow, and the average number of revealed bits
is  rev        rec.
Quake average values
    6
 rec 20000
 rev 5800
The net key rates for QKD round for probabilities of success of Eve’s attack   max
D  
  50      15 and   max
D     100      30 have been plotted in ﬁgures 4.16 and 4.17 as
functions of Eve’s average information per bit (ℓ). The authentication scheme used is a
Reed-Solomon based  -ASU2 with one-time pad.
To make a comparison, the  sec required to leave Eve no more than 1 bit of overall
knowledge on the ﬁnal key is 9732.
The net key rate as a function of the maximum probability success for Eve’s attack
(  max
D ) is drawn in ﬁgure4.18. Note how the probability of success of the attack decreases
exponentially with the rate reduction.
120000 bits correspond to the average length of sifted key for 50 packets, see [CBC+11] for details.4.3 Partial knowledge on the key, revised 69
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Figure 4.16: Net QKD output rate per round as a function of ℓ for   max
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Figure 4.18: Net QKD output rate as a function of  D.Chapter
5
The communication protocol
5.1 General description
We studied a network protocol to implement all the communication steps needed to
perform the processing of the keys exchanged through the quantum channel.
We chose to build our model of network interaction as an application layer protocol
on top of UDP in order to keep it as light as possible and to have a high level of control
over each transmitted packet. We decided not to use either TCP or other more complex
transport protocols so as not to be exposed to possible attacks that could exploit pecu-
liar weaknesses of communication-oriented protocols, e.g. those oriented to the sliding
window mechanism, or a TCP reset attack.
Our main goal is to be able to fully process a key that has been transmitted through
the quantum channel and to be reasonably sure that nobody interfered with our mes-
sages. We should keep in mind that we are communicating through a public channel, so
we cannot prevent a possible eavesdropper to sniff all of our packets. Similarly, it would
be naïve to try to forestall all possible DoS attacks, because it only takes cutting the wires
we are using for the processing, or, if we were using a free-air quantum channel, to put
a physical obstacle between Alice and Bob to completely disrupt our transmission.
The structure of the protocol is highly asymmetrical, since the roles of the two com-
municating parties are very focused on the speciﬁc and different tasks that Alice and
Bob are expected to perform during the quantum key distribution; therefore it has been
unavoidable to study two different transition models and even different states.
5.2 Our environment
In our setup the raw and the sifted keys are available in the form of indexed ﬁles as soon
as they have been successfully sent (by Alice) or received (by Bob).74 The communication protocol
Before the ﬁrst round, Alice and Bob must share a pool of secret keys that have been
previously exchanged through a secret channel (possibly from a previous QKD as well).
These keys will be used to generate the hash functions to authenticate the messages and
to calculate the one-time-pad of the authentication tags.
When the system starts up, both Alice and Bob are inStartstate and the hash function
is not set up yet.
We assume that Alice sends the last packet in each round. If this is not the case, it is
sufﬁcient to authenticate the last message of the round sent by Bob and the ﬁrst message
of the following round sent by Alice.
5.3 Packets
Every message of our application layer protocol can be fragmented among many UDP
packets that will be reassembled by the receiver using the information contained in the
packet headers.
These packets are characterised by a header that describes the content of the remain-
ing data of the datagram, and an optional payload, whose structure depends on the
speciﬁc packet type.
Header structure
The structure of the header is described in table 5.1.
0 15
seq_num
16 18 19 21 22 28 29 31
type flags unused l_b_l
flags:
19 20 21
more auth exp_hash
Table 5.1: Packet header
seq_num A 16-bit sequence number.
type Identiﬁes the type of packet. The currently allowed packet types are listed in table
5.2.
more Tells whether the message has been divided into more packets. If it is set to 1 it
means that the next packet carries the continuation of the same message. If the5.3 Packets 75
message is contained in a single message, or if the packet holds the ﬁnal part of the
message, it is set to 0.
auth Tells if the current packet contains the authenticating tag, which is appended to
the message.
exp_hash Signals that the sender’s hash function has expired.
unused Unused bits, to make the header length a multiple of 8 bits. They can contain
a random value to increase the header’s entropy.
l_b_l (Last block length) Tells the number of bits in the last byte of the packet that
contain data of the message, because as a rule we could have any length of the
data.
type
START 0
NEWHASH 1
SIFT 2
PROCESS 3
ABORT 7
Table 5.2: Packet types
Packet types
START
The START packet contains its header only. It may signal that the hash function has
expired with the exp_auth ﬂag set to 1.
SIFT
If Bob has any key ﬁles to process, he sends an authenticated message with the data
needed to start processing the key. If Bob has not got any key ﬁles but during the previ-
ous round a key has been generated, he sends an authenticated SIFT packet containing
only the header and the authenticating tag in the payload. In both cases, the authen-
tication tag is calculated for the concatenation of all the packets Bob sent from the last
authenticated SIFT message, or, if the previous round produced no key, for the current
SIFT message by itself.
If Bob has no key ﬁle and no key was generated during the previous round, he sends
an unauthenticated packet containing only the header.76 The communication protocol
PROCESS
This packet contains all the data needed to perform the key processing: parameters for
key reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation. The exact format of the data depends on
the speciﬁc method chosen to reconciliate the keys. The last PROCESS packet sent by
Alice during a key generation round contains a tag that authenticates all the messages
sent starting from the reception of the authenticated SIFT packet.
ABORT
The name of this packet is self-explaining: it means that something wrong has happened
and it signals that a reset of the connection is needed. Every partial result that has not
been conﬁrmed before is wiped out.
5.4 State transition model
The state transition diagram for the protocol is shown in ﬁgure5.1. Each box represents a
state, while each link represents a transition and is labelled by a description of the events
that are related to it. The events or the received packets that trigger the transition are
written before the slash character, while the messages that are consequently sent follow
it.
In each state, Alice (or Bob) waits for a message of the expected type and with the
expected sequence number. If such a valid message is received, Alice (Bob) moves to
the next state according to the transition labelled with the message type. If an invalid
message is received or after a given amount of time expires and no valid message has
been received,anABORTmessage is sent and theSTARTING state is selected. AllABORT
transitions describe an error event and are not explicitly drawn in ﬁgure 5.1.
5.5 State descriptions
STARTING
Description This is the state in which both Alice and Bob are when the system starts.
This state means that there is no active or valid connection to the other entity.
Interaction
Alice Alice periodically sends a START packet to Bob’s IP address. If Alice does not
hold a valid hash function (i.e. at startup there is no shared hash function, or the
current hash function has expired), the exp_hash is set to 1. When Alice receives
Bob’s reply, she switches toLOADING state or, if an expired hash function has been
signalled by one of the two sides, to HASH RENEWAL.5.5 State descriptions 77
STARTING
LOADING
PROCESSING
HASH RENEWAL
(exchange of 
PROCESS 
packets)
expired hash / NEWHASH
START / -
timeout / START
START and expired hash / NEWHASH
SIFT / -
empty SIFT / -
NEWHASH / -
- / PROCESS
(processing 
completed)
(a) Alice transitions
(exchange of 
PROCESS 
packets)
STARTING
SIFTING
PROCESSING
HASH RENEWAL
expired hash / NEWHASH
START / START
START / START
expired hash
- / SIFT
- / empty  SIFT
NEWHASH /
NEWHASH
PROCESS / -
(processing 
completed)
(b) Bob transitions
Figure 5.1: Diagram of state transitions for Alice (a) and Bob (b).78 The communication protocol
Bob Bob waits for aSTARTpacket from Alice. When aSTARTpacket has been received,
he replies with another START packet. If a valid hash function is not available (see
Alice case), the exp_hash is set to 1. Then, Bob switches to SIFTING state or,
if an expired hash function has been signalled by one of the two sides, to HASH
RENEWAL.
HASH RENEWAL
Description This state is reached when one of the two parties has no valid hash func-
tion anymore and has successfully signalled this event in a previous START, PROCESS,
or SIFT packet. In this state Alice chooses the keys that will be used to generate the
hash function and transmits their IDs to Bob.
Interaction
Alice 1. Alice gets the needed seed bits from the key database and generates a new
hash function. Then she sends a NEWHASH packet containing the addresses
of the used keys; the whole packet is authenticated by the new hash function.
2. Alice waits for Bob’s reply. If the reply is a NEWHASH packet with a valid
authentication, then the new hash function has been correctly validated, Alice
switches to LOADING state, otherwise an ABORT packet is sent and proceeds
to STARTING state.
Bob Bob waits for a NEWHASH packet from Alice. When a valid packet has been re-
ceived, he fetches the keys identiﬁed by the enclosed IDs from the key database
and generates the new hash function. Bob now checks that the packet has been
correctly authenticated by the new hash function. If this is the case, he sends an
empty validated NEWHASH packet to Alice and then switches to SIFTING state,
otherwise an ABORT packet is sent and proceeds to STARTING state.
SIFTING
Description This state is only used by Bob. In this step, Bob selects a sifted key from
the pool of available sifted key ﬁles and starts its processing.
Interaction
Bob Bob selects one of the sifted keys not yet processed and sends an authenticated
SIFT packet containing the ﬁle index, the sifting information and, possibly, infor-
mation for the reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation phases. Then Bob switches
to PROCESSING state.5.5 State descriptions 79
LOADING
Description This state is only used by Alice. In this step, Alice loads the raw key cor-
responding to the sifted key selected by Bob.
Interaction
Alice Alice receives a SIFT packet from Bob:
Authentication and sifting (Bob has a sifted key to process.) The SIFT packet re-
ceived is authenticated and its payload is not empty. Alice checks the packet
authentication. The ﬁnal key generated during the previous round, if there
is any, is stored into the key database. The raw keys identiﬁed by the in-
dexes contained in the packets are loaded. Alice performs the sifting and,
possibly, some other actions of the reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation
phases. Then Alice sends the ﬁrst PROCESS packet to Alice; if this is the only
PROCESS packet that will be sent during the current round, we authenticate
the concatenation of the packet and the generated ﬁnal key1, then Alice stays
in LOADING state. Otherwise, an ABORT packet is sent and Alice proceeds to
STARTING state.
Authentication only (Bob has no sifted key to process but there still is a ﬁnal key
to acknowledge.) The SIFT packet received is authenticated, but its payload
is empty. Alice checks the packet authentication. The ﬁnal key generated
during the previous round is stored into the key database. No key index has
been sent, so Bob has not got any sifted key left. Alice stays in LOADING state
and waits for the next SIFT packet. Otherwise, an ABORT packet is sent and
Alice proceeds to STARTING state.
Empty SIFT packet (Bob has no sifted key to process and there is no ﬁnal key to
acknowledge.) TheSIFTpacket received is not authenticated and its payload
is empty. No key index has been sent, so Bob has no sifted key left. Alice stays
in LOADING state and waits for the next SIFT packet.
If no valid packet is received within a timeout, an ABORT packet is sent and Alice
proceeds to STARTING state.
PROCESSING
Description In this state Alice and Bob exchange messages to accomplish the correct
generation of the ﬁnal key.
1At the last PROCESS packet the current round terminates, so Alice holds all the information needed
to generate the ﬁnal key.80 The communication protocol
Interaction
Alice sends and receives PROCESS packets.
Last packet The last PROCESS packet sent by Alice will be the last packet of the
current round. It contains the last information needed to generate the ﬁnal
key and the authentication of the concatenation of all the packets sent by Alice
during the PROCESSING state of the current round and the ﬁnal key. Then Alice
switches to LOADING state. On errors, an ABORT packet is sent and Alice
proceeds to STARTING state.
Bob sends and receives PROCESS packets.
Last packet The last PROCESS packet sent by Alice contains all the necessary in-
formation to generate the ﬁnal key and must be authenticated as described
above. Bob generates the ﬁnal key and veriﬁes the authentication of all the
packets received by Bob during the PROCESSING state of the current round and the
ﬁnal key. If the authentication is valid, Bob stores the ﬁnal key into the key
database and switches to SIFTING state. On errors, an ABORT packet is sent
and Bob proceeds to STARTING state.
5.6 Security of the protocol
This protocol guarantees that every key that has been generated and conﬁrmed by an
authenticated reply, as explained above, is genuine and that it has not been tampered
with by a third party. In fact we can observe that there is only one way that leads from
the STARTING state to the generation and storing of a ﬁnal key into the key database:
namely, both Alice and Bob have to go through a series of states that lead to an authen-
ticated reply. This reply contains a tag that authenticates all the outgoing messages that
carried information needed to generate the key. Therefore, we can state that all the paths
that can be chosen, according to the state transition diagrams in ﬁgure 5.1, must comply
with one of the cases in ﬁgure 5.2.
The hash function used to generate and check the correctness of the authentication
tags is guaranteed to be valid, because, if it had expired, only the HASH RENEWAL state
would have been reachable.
Possible errors
Since it could happen that a mismatch between Alice’s and Bob’s reconciled keys went
undetected, there is some probability for the two ﬁnal keys to be different after privacy
ampliﬁcation. This is why Alice is needed to authenticate the ﬁnal key along with the
sent messages: we are using the authentication function for the further purpose of en-
suring that the reconciliation phase has been successful.5.6 Security of the protocol 81
LOADING 1
PROCESSING
(exchange of 
PROCESS 
packets)
SIFT 1 / -
LOADING 2
SIFT 2 / -
- / PROCESS 
(processing 
completed)
(a) The Message SIFT 1 authenticates itself
and the PROCESS messages received during
the previous round, if any. The Message
SIFT 2 authenticates all PROCESS messages
received during the current round.
SIFTING 1
PROCESSING
- / SIFT
PROCESS / -
(processing 
completed)
SIFTING 2
(exchange of 
PROCESS 
packets)
(b) The last PROCESS message authenticates
all   the   messages   received   during   current
round, besides the ﬁnal key.
Figure 5.2: Possible state transitions that lead to the generation of a ﬁnal key for Alice
(a) and Bob (b). Transitions marked with thick lines are the authenticated ones. Packets
marked in bold are the ones containing the related authenticating tags.
In our protocol model, if one or more mismatches in the reconciliation phase have
not been corrected, we cannot distinguish this case from the case in which an attacker
has been trying to forge one of the messages.
As an alternative, one could use a protocol in which the messages and the ﬁnal key
are authenticated separately, at the cost of adding an authentication step and, there-
fore, shortening the number of rounds a single hash function could have been used. We
chose instead to use only one authentication and handle an invalid authentication as a
tampering attempt performed by an attacker.82 The communication protocol
Possible attacks
It would be very difﬁcult for a tampering attack to go undetected due to the bounds on
the probability of success imposed by the authentication step (see paragraph 2.1). In the
overwhelming majority of the cases, such an attack could only lead to the failure of the
whole process due to the unsuccessful validation of the forged tag.
The only attack that could be carried out with signiﬁcant results against this setup
would be to continuously intercept some packet during each round, thus preventing
each partial key from being processed completely. In fart, any lost, or corrupted, packet
would bring to the round being aborted. As every authentication shortens the hash
function lifetime, and uses one-time pad to encrypt the hash value, sooner or later both
Alice and Bob will reach the point where no shared keys are available anymore, and
quantum key distribution is no longer possible.
The same effect could be obtained by sending an uninterrupted sequence of ABORT
and START packets with the exp_hash ﬂag set to 1: this would cause the legitimate
party to spoil every valid key in the attempt of generating new hash functions that would
be continuously replaced by new ones.Chapter
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Conclusions
In this work we have considered the problem of providing unconditionally secure au-
thentication for the public transmission in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). In partic-
ular we have studied speciﬁc classes of hash functions, called  -Almost Strongly Uni-
versal ( -ASU2), that allow to build authentication codes whose robustness is not based
on the attack computational complexity. These hash functions generate a tag   for each
message   to be authenticated. Even if a valid couple       is intercepted by an attacker
on the public channel, a  -ASU2 class ensures that the success probability of both imper-
sonation and substitution attacks are upper bounded by a function of the tag length  
and the total number   of hash functions.
Since the hash functions are used in the context of QKD, it is important to reduce the
rate of key bits consumed by the authentication code, because this rate will be subtracted
from the actual key generation rate. Wegman and Carter proposed to use a single hash
function more than once by encrypting the hash value with a one-time pad, but Ceder-
löf and Larsson pointed out how it is possible to accomplish a successful attack if the
opponent has partial information on the keys used for the one-time pad, as is the case
with QKD.
In this work we have introduced a general upper bound to the probability  D of suc-
cess for the attacker in the case of a Cederlöf-Larsson like attack as a function of both
the number of authentications performed with a same hash function, and the average
information that the opponent has on each key bit. This is, at the best of our knowledge,
the ﬁrst upper bound on  D for this kind of attack, and it allows to calculate the maxi-
mum number of times a single hash function can be used (see equation (4.30)), and the
minimum key rate needed for unconditionally secure authentication (equation (4.32)).
Optimisation of these parameters is of utmost importance to attain the highest possi-
ble output rate in QKD. In paragraph 4.3 the optimisation of the ﬁnal key rate for the
QuAKE experiment (a B92 QKD system developed by the QuantumFuture project of
the University of Padova) is described, and it is shown that the probability of success of84 Conclusions
attack decreases exponentially with the rate loss.
Many constructions for  -ASU2 hash function classes have been reviewed and com-
pared. The best authentication method seen in this work is Reed-Solomon based -ASU2
hash function class. Besides being a small class (its size is    3n+2(log2 m log2 n), with  
being the maximum message length and   being the tag length), it is also ﬂexible, since
there exists a class for each values of maximum message length   and tag length  .
Even if Reed-Solomon is not always the smallest sized class available1, its cardinality
has a constant ratio <2 with respect to the lower bound (2.12) (see ﬁgure 3.1).
Finally, the communication protocol speciﬁcally designed for QuAKE has been de-
scribed, with details on the packet structure, on the interaction model of the two parties
and on the different phases of the key processing. The authentication related features
have been particularly stressed.
6.1 Future work
Since during QKD all the transmitted data is continuously authenticated, it is important
to correctly estimate the amount of time that it takes to initialise a new hash function,
as, during this time, no data can be authenticated. It is important, hence, to choose
the combination of tag length, privacy ampliﬁcation parameters and, as a consequence,
maximum lifetime of a single hash function, which allows to attain the maximum output
key rate.
It could be appropriate to generate ﬁnal keys with adjustable ℓ (that is Eve’s average
information per bit on ﬁnal keys), because the requirements on ℓ for authentication keys
could be far stricter than those of different applications. In this case it would be sufﬁcient
to decide beforehand the purpose of the keys produced during each round and then set
the privacy ampliﬁcation parameter consequently.
1See, for example, authentication codes based on geometrical codes like those described in [Bie97a],
which have the drawback of existing only for some values of m and n.Bibliography
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